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Supporting the U.S. Department of State remove explosive hazards from a public fuel depot near Mosul, Iraq, which helped restore transportation operations critical
to agricultural activity.
Photo courtesy of Tetra Tech project photo.
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n 1999, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines issued a

an integrated approach to removing landmines from the ground

seminal report entitled Landmine Monitor: Toward a Mine-Free

and reducing their disastrous impact on mine-affected communi-

World. How prophetic they were on the one hand, and how unbri-

ties. Nobody knows how many mines there are in the ground, and

dled and unrealistic the Campaign was on the other. Fresh off the 1997

that number is not very relevant, despite the attention given to

Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), the report notes a U.S.

the issue. What is relevant is how many people are affected by the

State Department 1998 declaration that removal had surpassed plant-

presence of mines, which are obstacles to post-conflict reconstruc-

ing, and “it appears that we have turned the tide in the battle against

tion and socio-economic re-development.3

mines, and that it is possible to solve the AP [anti-personnel] mine cri-

The campaign’s enthusiasm around rapid resolution of the prob-

sis in years not decades.”1 The report, stating that the past decade has

lem was not misguided; after all, parties to the APMBC agreed to

focused on the threat to innocent civilians, heralds the emergence of

clear their contaminated territory within ten years. Two decades later,

a development assistance oriented approach toward demining, known

however, the international community continues to set new clearance

as humanitarian mine action (HMA), which is

timeframes while providing continued assistance.
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Around the time of the initial 1999 Landmine Monitor report, the
UN held the Millennium Summit in 2000 where member nations
adopted an agreement known as the Millennium Declaration, which
set forth goals and principles geared toward ending underdevelopment and abject poverty, and promoting peace and security. From this
agreement, eight broad goals were issued around social-, economic-,
and health-based objectives known as the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs). The goals covered poverty, education, gender equality,
child mortality, maternal health, disease, the environment, and global
partnership, and established twenty-one specific development targets
along with sixty indicators to be achieved by 2015.4 Some states met
some objectives, a few achieved many, while many states achieved few,
if any, objectives.
The 2015 UN Summit was devoted to the next round of development goals, and the international community discussed the range of
challenges and impediments toward lasting development, security,
and stability faced by so many countries. The summit also celebrated
successes, as broadly measured by quality-of-life gains like positive
changes in poverty (those living above the $1.25 per day standard),
access to clean water, literacy improvements, and gender parity in primary education.5 Understanding better the success and shortfalls of
the MDG process (2000–2015) was critical, and the insight gleaned was
valuable for understanding how to meet the new development goals set
for 2015–2030, known as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Unfortunately, the relationships between mines and development
were not addressed by policy and programming surrounding the 2000
MDGs, nor during the 1997 establishment of the International Mine
Action Standards (IMAS) and the United Nations Mine Action Service
(UNMAS). Moreover, while some policy writing around the last millennium did explore the issue, the SDGs of 2015 still did not address
landmines and demining as intermediate variables along the pathway
to development. This lack of connectivity will be addressed further, but
for now, the point is that establishing a relationship between HMA
and global development goals was not done well previously, and

ideology, the use of public revenue to support socioeconomic needs
in other countries is receiving more scrutiny, along with more consistent and wider expectations for demonstrable results, benefitting
both recipient and donor. Additionally, further challenges may yet
arise as the vast amount of donor support is concentrated quite narrowly—both in terms of the percentage of support offered by a handful
of donors as well as the majority of assistance being provided to just a
handful of recipient countries.
According to the 2019 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor,
the three largest mine action donors from 2014 to 2018 (United States,
European Union, and Japan) account for nearly 58 percent of all funding. The top seven donors (adding the United Kingdom, Germany,
Norway, and the Netherlands) accounted for $2.147 billion of the
$2.629 billion in total assistance.
Also according to the 2019 Landmine Monitor, the level of US
funding alone over this time frame, $947.1 million, accounted for 36
percent of total global funding.7 However, the US 2017 HMA funding of $320.6 million was more than double the US 2016 HMA contribution of $152.4 million. Additionally, more than half of the 2017
funds ($169.35 million) went to projects in Iraq and Syria alone.8 In
comparison, these two countries received $17 million more than the
total US 2016 contribution, and of that $152.4 million, $106.55 million went to Iraq.9
Fortunately, US funding has remained strong for years, with consistent bipartisan congressional and presidential support. Despite recent
annual averages of roughly $200 million from the United States alone,
resources fall short compared to need. Overall, while there are approximately sixty contaminated countries, six countries alone received
nearly 52 percent ($1.361 billion) of the total 2014–2018 funding for
mine action assistance.10
With these challenges in mind, a brief look at global development
assistance funding is warranted. As noted in the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in Table 1, total net
resource flows for global development assistance steadily decreased in

doing so now is critical for the future of HMA.

terms of the percentage of cumulative donor Gross National Income

THE FUNDING DOMAIN

actual dollar amounts of development assistance remained relatively

At a macro level, globalism currently competes with an inward-

(GNI) from 2010 to 2017, with the exception of 2014. Fortunately, the
steady, with upticks in 2016 and 2017.

looking nationalistic populism that is pressing for reduced levels of

In 2018, overseas official development assistance was $149.3 billion,

foreign assistance while demanding greater accountability for any

though “foreign direct investment to developing countries dropped by

overseas investments based on “national interest.” The argument at

around a third from 2016 to 2017, following a 12 percent drop in overall

hand is driven by concern over value for money, return on investment,

external finance from 2013 to 2016.”11 Additionally, recent assistance

and a sustainable, demonstrable impact. Fiscal responsibility is thus

levels were weakened by the significant sums spent on Middle East

the clarion call to which both the global assistance and HMA commu-

refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) costs—for example, the

nities must answer—and with clear substantiation, as both are often

level of donor assistance expenditures focused on refugee costs alone

considered foreign policy tools.6

increased in 2016 by 27.5 percent to $15.4 billion from 2015 costs.12

Donors contribute for varying reasons, depending on amount,

These financial snapshots suggests several takeaways for the HMA

cause, beneficiaries, recipients, and timing. While motives may range

community: (1) overarching development assistance is somewhat

from altruism to legislative mandate (i.e., the United Kingdom), to

unstable, (2) enormous sums, comparatively, flow through development

unabashed self-interest, countries nonetheless expect a return on their

assistance streams, and (3) critical issue areas for Official Development

humanitarian assistance—whether it be increased stability, enhanced

Assistance (ODA) policy include considerations highly connected to

self-sufficiency, improved relationships, future market access for

HMA—namely, humanitarian assistance funding, cost of displaced

the donor’s private sector, or all of the above. Regardless of political

persons, and direct foreign investment and other private funding.
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FLIPPING THE SCRIPT: CHANGING THE ETHOS
FROM CASUALTY REDUCTION TO SUPPORTING
DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES
Much HMA progress over the past two decades has come from a dedicated and consistent higher-order message that was the cornerstone
of the initial campaign: mine action saves innocent lives.14 That said,
however, the horrors of chronic underdevelopment far eclipse damage
caused by mines and munitions when measured in deaths and victims.
The 2019 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor reported 149
square kilometers cleared worldwide in 2016,15 when global victims
totaled 9,439 (the second highest total in over twenty years),16 including approximately 2,100 deaths.17 Typical estimates are that over 80
percent of mine victims are civilian and almost half are children—in
many instances because they are working in fields or picking up scrap
metal to help earn family income. In contrast, an analysis of global
health data indicate that an “innocent victimization” milieu around
children in the developing world in 2016 was considerably worse:
Children in a Central Africa Republic community that Tetra Tech was assisting
under a USAID illegal mining and conflict diamonds project.
Photo courtesy of Tetra Tech.

•

One in twelve children under the age of five in sub-Saharan
Africa died, and one in twenty-two died in South Asia; the North
American ratio was 1:152 and the European ratio was 1:204.

•

2.78 million children under the age of five in sub-Saharan Africa

Most critical, however, is the need to recognize that the HMA

died, along with another 1.73 million children in South Asia.

community has an important opportunity to better align with, and

This contrasts with 28,000 North American deaths and 43,000

integrate into, global development assistance objectives. Integration

in Europe.19

is imperative at this time when many donor countries face internal

•

Deaths among children aged five to fourteen in sub-Saharan

sociopolitical pressures to focus public spending internally and to bet-

Africa totaled 513, 000, 241,000 in Southern Asia, 10,000 in

ter substantiate returns on their investments made abroad. Two of the

Europe, and 6,000 in North America.20

biggest HMA donors, the United States and the United Kingdom, for

•

407,000 people died from malaria in Africa alone.21

example, are each mired in political consternation about reducing for-

•

525,000 children died from diarrhoeal diseases, with over 1,400
deaths per day.22

eign assistance spending and reorganizing their national foreign assistance institutions and mandates. While global funding for HMA was

•

1.4 million children under the age of five died from acute lower

at an all-time high in 2017 and 2018,13 increased donor fatigue toward

respiratory infection, more than 95 percent of whom were from

HMA and development assistance is a real possibility (particularly

low and middle income countries.23

should donor assistance disproportionately shift toward global health

The main point of these examples is not to suggest the horror and out-

requirements, and even more so should a global recession emerge as

rage associated with munitions contaminants should lessen, but rather

a result of COVID-19), as is the uncertainty associated with chang-

the emphasis on how mines/munitions preclude development outcomes

ing foreign policy and national security priorities related to assisting

should concurrently sharpen. For instance, all of the above mortality

conflict-affected countries, peacekeeping missions, and the larger

categories are considered preventable—if the levels of national devel-

Overseas Contingency Operations (to use a US term). With increased

opment were improved.24 Perhaps the policy orientation of HMA

competition for potentially diminishing funds, strengthening the

needs to include the alignment between mine action and the SDGs,

synergistic HMA-development relationship may help both commu-

and toward the contributory impact mine action success or failure has

nities achieve more with less.

on social, political, and economic well-being.
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Total Official Development
Assistance and Private
Flows*

512,792

504,701

477,702

450,382

587,731

315,651

317,435

422,968

Only Official Development
Assistance **

128,484

135,111

127,030

134,847

137,539

131,563

144,921

147,160

1.25

1.14

1.07

0.99

1.26

0.72

0.71

.89

Total Flows as % of GNI

* This includes bilateral and multilateral institutional assistance, along with other official public investment, as well as all private direct investment and private grants.
** Only governmental bilateral and multilateral institutional assistance is included.
Table 1. OECD Global Development Assistance Trendline (in millions).
Figure courtesy of OECD International Development Statistics, Volume 2018 Issue 1.
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victim assistance and development. Neither demining nor
HMA were associated with the 2000 MDG efforts, or, more
sadly, in the literature and conversations surrounding the
2015 SDGs, including the UN publication Transforming our
World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development). 26
Perhaps more important, however, IMAS Series 14
(Evaluation of Mine Action Programmes 14.10 and 14.20)
makes scarce reference to development. 27 Neither document even raises the idea of exploring measurable connections between HMA activities and development outcomes
and impacts. Although Series 14 is overdue for an update
(all IMAS publications are scheduled for updates every three
years), it is possible that the task and imperative before
us will be better served by a new IMAS series focused on
aligning and measuring the relationship between mine
action and development. At the very least, an IMAS 14.30
should be considered.
Most important though, the November 2019 Oslo Review
Conference does make clear that mine action is a “key
enabler for development, humanitarian action, peace and
security”28 and that the corresponding Action Plan for
With support from the U.S. Department of State and other donors, the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic has linked UXO removal to its National Development plan, where female demining
teams play an important role in UXO Lao’s efforts to clear land for economic development.
Photo courtesy of Tetra Tech project photo.

Although the sine qua non role of mine action in post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization countries is generally understood, undertaking more specific causal pathway mapping exercises does not seem
widespread. Much like modelling used to measure the impact of donor
and foreign direct investment on post-war reconstruction to help guide
economic growth, algorithmic models could highlight the potential
impact of appropriate, timely, and sufficient HMA on development
objectives and the corresponding impact on resulting economic growth
forecasting. Likewise, and conversely, models should run the potential
impact of insufficient or non-existent munitions response.

25

This should not be an overly onerous task, given a twenty-plus
year applied policy and programming research base from the Geneva

2020-2024 includes focal points for HMA to further the
achievement of the SDGs. The time is indeed right for HMA
to evolve as a significant component of this development/

security equation—one more widely and publicly seen and understood, and one better articulated in terms of evidence-based input,
with HMA becoming an intervening variable contributing toward a
larger series of ends, namely the SDGs. This evolution will require
demonstrating return on investment in terms of both the technical
aspects of HMA, e.g., monitoring and evaluating current key performance indicators (KPIs), 29 and on a new set of impact analytics that
measure how HMA serves as an intervening variable on a range of
development objectives and outcomes.

INCREASING THE BANG FOR THE BUCK:
DEMONSTRATING VALUE, SUBSTANTIATING
RETURN ON INVESTMENT

International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD, estab-

HMA donor support has tended to be tied more toward a given for-

lished in 1998), The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction,

eign policy or national security platform rather than a development

and the Peace Research Institute Oslo’s (PRIO) project: Assistance to

assistance agenda. The United States, for example, has provided more

Mine-Affected Communities, which ran from 1999–2009. The United

than $3.7 billion dollars of total conventional weapons destruction

Nations Development Program (UNDP) also works closely with the

assistance to over 100 countries from 1993–2019, making the United

GICHD and PRIO (and others), co-sponsoring events and research,

States the single largest donor by far. However, just under $1.6 billion

and the UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action

was spent on only five countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Laos, Cambodia,

(IACG-MA) has long had between twelve and fourteen members

and Vietnam).30 This pattern of linking mine assistance to national

whose mandates include some aspect of mine action as well as devel-

security and foreign policy is consistent with other large donors. The

opment assistance.

point is this approach will have to change if HMA is to play a signifi-

In spite of some efforts to create bridgeheads on each side, the spans

cant contributory role in achieving the global SDGs. A wider country

connecting HMA and development assistance communities have

distribution pattern is one approach; however, integrating HMA more

not been adequately built. For example, no references to economic

widely into development assistance policy and programming ought to

growth and development were made in the original 1999 Maputo

enable more countries to provide more support to HMA efforts.

Declaration nor in the ensuing 2014 Review Conference. Similarly,

Similarly, development assistance is increasingly becoming more of

the 2016 Convention on Cluster Munitions had just one reference to

a foreign policy and/or national security tool. In terms of additional
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similarities, the intent of both HMA support and development assis-

•

tance is to lessen suffering, fear, risk, and both physical and economic

iency related to environmental and climate-oriented changes

insecurity, and to improve human and community well-being. Also,
the performance and impact of both communities should be held

Assisting contaminated countries with preparedness and resilthat might increase explosive ordnance hazards

•

Helping define and promote public-private partnerships

accountable. Although both communities ought to be exploring their

The HMA and development assistance relationship should have dif-

relationship more explicitly, perhaps the onus falls on the HMA com-

ferent degrees of connectivity or alignment in different circumstances,

munity to better demonstrate its value to development assistance.

as Gasser noted. 35 There are instances where

31

If mine action is to receive the support needed to accomplish the
larger HMA mission, it will likely need to adopt a value-for-money

1. No formal linkage can or should be made, such as when political
and/or security considerations supersede development efforts.

orientation, defining and operationalizing a performance-based

2. Coordination should be the objective when development priori-

management approach toward development outcomes. The sector

ties focus on jobs and anti-poverty objectives while the political-

must be able to both articulate and substantiate evidenced-based

military imperatives are weapons removal and abatement and

policy, programming, and budgeting capabilities and results.

clearing ground.

Demonstrating value is particularly important as Stanley Brown

3. HMA leads and is an enabler of development assistance when

(U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State) recently noted, the “global

munitions prioritization takes precedent and development

need for HMA programs continues to outstrip available resources.”32

activities require clearance a priori before they can begin.

Moreover, in the post-COVID-19 economy, resources for both HMA
and development assistance writ large may be further challenged.

4. Active integrated planning and execution is prioritized, and
HMA efforts and objectives are viewed as part of an overall

Although the HMA community will likely be better served by taking

development strategy—in other words, mine action impact is a

the initiative, defining, tracking, and reporting on development and

formal part of a development impact assessment such that a low-

outcome-based KPIs will require cooperation and collaboration with

priority mine action area might be cleared first to help accom-

the development assistance community. Ideally, both communities

plish development objectives.

will be able to articulate how the presence or absence of HMA affects

In the end, if actionable correlations between HMA and the SDGs

development goals from the immediate to the long-term (including

can be framed, supported, and communicated, the value for money

the policy and programming distinctions between humanitarian

argument becomes easier in terms of attracting resources from both

assistance and longer-term development). Noting that we are already

public and private sources, including increased direct foreign invest-

one-third through the fifteen-year SDG performance period, such an

ment. 36 This alignment and integration of HMA and development will

outcome will require immediate action on the part of both communi-

not only enable more effective and efficient targeting of whatever

ties to increase dialogue in earnest, to better and more fully frame and

resources are available, but will also improve investment risk mitiga-

initiate operational research agendas, to pilot targeted programs, and

tion, which may in turn generate more sustainable post-clearance

to develop and execute a monitoring, evaluation, and learning regi-

investments. As HMA activities are better framed as enablers and cat-

ment focused on HMA-SDG relationships.

alysts for development as opposed to separate precursors to develop-

This process will require widespread recognition of the need for
policy, programming, and budget evolution/maturation associated

ment, the value for money argument is strengthened, further justifying
sustained mine action expenditures.
See endnotes page 68

with mainstreaming HMA into development assistance (see endnote
25). The joint GICHD and UNDP report “Leaving No One Behind”
provides a solid foundation on which to build, as does the 2019 Oslo
Review Conference report. 33 Illustrative areas where over a half century of relevant development assistance expertise can be applied to
existing HMA include:
•

Assistance with improving assessments, monitoring, evaluation, and learning (to include knowledge and data management systems)

•

Enhancing sustainable land management and use—including
strong return on investment estimating to prioritize actions
(including a focus on critical infrastructure and resumption of
economic activity)

•

Institutional strengthening of national mine action authorities—including improving transparency and accountability,
and management/leadership capabilities

•

Helping national authorities develop a whole-of-government orientation, working more effectively with other national ministries,
including integrating HMA into national development plans34
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